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It has thus become increasingly difficult to delineate the boundaries between a nation’s sovereign right to 
regulate and its obligation to the international community not to restrict trade gratuitously. (Trebilcock and 
Howse 1999, p. 135) 
 
Trade negotiations on standards are not about doing away with them, as with tariffs, because standards 
serve a social purpose. (Hufbauer et al. 2002) 
 
1.  Introduction 
 International trade in agricultural and food products remains one of the most 
sensitive issues in the commercial relations of nations.  For agricultural products, the 
principal traditional issues are:  the lack of market access caused by tariffs and tariff rate 
quotas;  the levels and nature of domestic support, much of which is still provided 
through trade-distorting instruments;  and assistance to exports in the form of subsidies.  
There remains a considerable gulf between governments on each of these topics in the 
current trade negotiations taking place in the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Trade in 
agricultural products is also curtailed by sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) barriers but, 
since the introduction of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures in 1995, with a few exceptions (e.g., the Canada-Australia 
salmon case), there does not appear to have been too much disharmony in the context of 
reducing tensions in the areas of plant health and animal health.  Indeed, in the current 
negotiations, there have been no proposals to re-open the Agreement on those grounds 
(IATRC 2001, p. x). 
 For international trade in food products, food safety (and quality) is perhaps the 
major issue, although disquiet in developing countries about the continued use by 
developed countries of escalating tariffs, remains important.  In the context of food safety, 
the SPS Agreement has been less successful in resolving disagreements (e.g., the EU-U.S. 
beef hormones case) because of the fundamental tension that exists between consumers’ 
preferences and consumer protection on the one hand and consumers’ gains from trade on 
the other (IATRC, 2001, p. viii).  Moreover, the Agreement was motivated originally by 
the need to constrain the protection afforded to producers from import barriers and not by 
protection for consumers from imports (Perdikis et al. 2001).  It is clear from the various 
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negotiating proposals which have been put forward to the WTO Committee on 
Agriculture as part of the agricultural negotiations, that food safety, as well as other 
aspects of food (e.g., geographic indications, shelf-life labelling and GM foods), is 
regarded as an important “non-trade’ concern by a number of countries.1 
 With the rapid pace of technological change in the food processing industry, with 
improved transportation and with increasingly international supply chains, the perception 
is growing that imported food may be a source of increased health risks for food 
consumers.  The erection of import barriers by governments to regulate that risk and to 
secure the health of their human populations, is also governed by the SPS Agreement. 
 It is important to make a distinction between the objectives of trade negotiations 
in the traditional areas and those on SPS matters.  In the former, the aim is to secure a 
movement towards freer international markets by reducing trade barriers in order to 
increase national incomes everywhere:  in the latter, the aim is to define a set of standards 
or regulations which will be minimally trade distorting but which will yet achieve 
different countries’ social objectives about the extent to which their citizens are exposed 
to unsafe or low-quality foods.  In the context of the traditional areas, the welfare gains 
from trade liberalisation are assumed to apply generally, as a principle, across all products 
and all countries;  in the second, because of market failure, the welfare gains need to be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis without there being any presumption of general 
application. 
 In matters to do with sanitary and phytosanitary measures, the issue is the extent 
to which individual governments should be constrained in defining their domestic 
regulations, regulations which may reduce the benefits from trade for other countries 
should such regulations prove to be unnecessarily strict.  The onus appears to be on the 
importing countries to define their barriers to imports in a way which is consistent with 
the Agreement;  there does not appear to be any requirement, other than commercial self-
interest, on exporting countries to ensure that the food which they export is safe 
(Charnovitz 2002).2 The SPS Agreement curtails not only what a government may do ‘at 
the border’, the traditional view of trade policy, but also what a government may do 
                                                 
1 See IATRC (2001, Table 1.2) for a list of the proposals. 
2 The Codex Alimentarius Commission has produced a Code of Ethics for International Trade in Food, one 
of the principles in which is that no food should be in international trade which contains anything injurious 
to health (Charnovitz 2002, p. 225). 
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‘within the border’.  Hence, the SPS Agreement is a substantial departure from the 
original activities of the GATT which stopped at national borders. 
 In the traditional areas of trade negotiations for agricultural products it is assumed 
that there are no market failures.  In the area of food safety, there is a potentially serious 
market failure in the form of imperfect information amongst consumers in importing 
countries.  The implications of imperfect and asymmetric information are outlined 
(Section 2).3  The SPS Agreement is underpinned by standards which are defined by one 
of three international organisations or through a risk assessment undertaken by a national 
government.  For internationally recognised standards dealing food safety and human 
health, the relevant organisation is the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CODEX).4  The 
key elements of the Agreement are explained (Section 3).5  One element of the risk 
assessment undertaken by the Codex Alimentarius Commission or by national 
governments is estimation of the probabilities of certain risks.  However, the way in 
which these probabilities are used in assessing the risks involved in consuming a 
particular food product and in defining the risk management strategy, may not be 
appropriate.  An elaboration of this observation is provided (Section 4).  A summary and 
some conclusions are presented (Section 5). 
2.  Some Economic Issues on the Demand Side 
 Consumers in developed countries increasingly are demanding year-round access 
to a wide variety of high quality (safe) foods.  The demand for a particular food product 
depends upon consumers’ preferences for the observed and unobserved characteristics 
embodied in that food, as well as upon its price and their incomes.  One of the most 
important unobserved characteristics is that of food safety.  The lack of food safety may 
arise from a number of possible sources, e.g., from residues of veterinary drugs, from 
pesticide residues, from food additives, from pathogens, from heavy metals, organo-
chemical pollutants and from prions (e.g., BSE) (Buzby 2001, p. 55).  Recently, the topic 
of GM food has become another source of concern about food safety (see Feldmann et al. 
2000). 
                                                 
3 An economic framework for modelling the more general issue of technical barriers to agricultural trade is 
provided in Roberts et al. (1999). 
4 For matters to do with plant health the relevant organisation is the International Plant Protection 
Convention and for animal health it is the International Office of Epizootics. 
5 For the wider issue of food attributes, of which food safety is a part, the Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade (TBT Agreement) is the more relevant Agreement.  These wider issues are not pursued here but 
see IATRC (2001). 
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 Consumers’ perceptions about food safety can be unduly, irrationally and 
negatively influenced by well-publicised disagreements amongst scientific experts and by 
accidents.  They may take some time to be revived following such events.  Where these 
accidents occur in imported food, then the detrimental effects on the exporting country 
may be long term.  It is in the interests of governments in both importing and exporting 
countries to ensure that irrational changes in consumers’ preferences do not undermine 
the gains from trade for both sets of countries.  The economics of the issue of food safety 
for consumers in importing countries and firms in exporting countries will now be 
pursued in more detail. 
2.1  Consumers in Importing Countries 
 The existence of unobserved characteristics of foods implies that consumers do 
not have perfect information about the products that they consume.  In economic theory, 
it is often assumed that both the many producers and the many consumers have perfect 
information and that the resulting competitive market outcome is socially optimal.  
However, in many respects, food safety is a credence characteristic, i.e., a characteristic 
which, at least in the short run, the consumer cannot identify even after the product is 
consumed and, therefore, has no information about it.6  This lack of perfect information 
causes a market failure in the absence of government intervention.  Moreover, it also has 
implications for the size and sign of the gains from trade which, as conventionally 
measured, assumes perfect information.  In particular, the gains are diminished and, in 
principle, may even be negative, if the imported product has sufficiently undesirable 
credence characteristics (OECD 1999, p. 38).  The doubt about safety that is created in 
consumers’ minds reduces their average willingness to pay for the food item, the 
domestic demand function then shifts leftwards and, as a consequence, imports fall.  
Because there is no credible way for exporting firms or exporting countries to signal the 
quality of their product to foreign consumers because of the credence characteristic, the 
importing country government may have a role to play in implementing regulations on 
                                                 
6 Goods are usually put into one of three categories.  “Search” goods are those for which the consumer can 
assess the quality prior to purchase and can obtain perfect information, perhaps through costly searching.  
“Experience” goods are those for which an assessment about quality can be made only after consuming the 
good.  For a more general and theoretical discussion of the market failure to which lack of perfect 
information gives rise, see Tirole (1988, chapter 2.3). 
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imports which will remove the doubt in consumers’ minds.  These regulations of course 
must be consistent with the SPS Agreement.7 
2.2  Firms in Exporting Countries 
 When importing firms or countries have imperfect information about the safety of 
food exports from individual exporting firms or exporting countries, there is information 
asymmetry and market failure.  In the absence of any government intervention in either 
importing or exporting countries, importers may use the country of origin as a measure of 
the minimum amount of food safety to be expected.  Hence, no exporting firm in a given 
country has an incentive to provide a higher quality product than the minimum level for 
that country, especially if, as usually assumed, high-quality costs more to produce than 
low quality.  For those firms which decide to provide a high quality product, their efforts 
are undermined by the firms which produce low-quality products.  Hence, the mix of 
quality produced will not match the consumers’ preferred mix and high-quality food will 
be under-produced for export, thus leading to a socially sub-optimal situation.  In such 
circumstances, it may be recommended to the government in the exporting country that it 
introduces regulations for minimum quality in its food exports.  Such regulations have 
been shown to be socially optimal for the exporting country and, moreover, they will 
increase the volume and price of exports because they prevent the reduction in 
consumers’ willingness to pay in the face of imperfect information.  Thus, regulations 
provide information to importers which the market alone cannot provide and they help to 
solve the market failure caused by asymmetric information and credence characteristic of 
food safety. 
 Export regulations may take a variety of forms.  For example, a government 
agency might operate a quality control process through inspecting products prior to export 
and providing a certificate of standard.8  This certificate signals to the importers that the 
food product is at least at some minimum level of safety, assuming of course that the 
agency is credible.  An alternative approach is to provide quality assurance procedures.  
One well-known set of such procedures is Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point 
(HACCP).  HACCP is a set of principles which are applied to help identify hazards and 
                                                 
7 An alternative to implementing regulations as a way of providing information is the use of labelling.  For 
an assessment  of labelling in international trade in a vertically differentiated product, see Roe and Sheldon 
(2001) and for a discussion that consumers may lose from labelling in an internationally traded good, see 
Creane (1998). 
8 For a thorough discussion of export regulations and whether they ought to be implemented by a 
government agency or by private firms, see Wills and Harris (1994). 
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the points in a production process at which it is most beneficial to carry out controls 
which reduce risks (OECD 1999, p. 20).9  Another private control strategy is third-party 
certification such as that provided by the International Organization for Standardization 
(e.g., ISO 9000) (Buzby 2001, p. 64).  In the case where the missing information is an 
experience, rather than a credence, characteristic, private quality assurance schemes may 
work.  However, to do so credibly, the exporting firms involved must be able to signal the 
quality to importing firms and consumers by establishing a reputation for quality which 
they can guarantee.  This signal or guarantee may take the form of a ‘hostage’, i.e., the 
exporting firm can prove to the import buyer that the gains to the former from cheating 
are less than the losses incurred from forfeiting its hostage.  The hostage might be sunk 
costs in specialised plant and equipment or might be the sunk costs incurred in developing 
relationships with importing firms.10 
3.  Elements of the SPS Agreement 
 Any regulations which a government imposes on imported food must be 
consistent with the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (WTO 1995, pp. 69-84).  In the Agreement, a sanitary and phytosanitary 
measure is defined as any measure applied: 
(a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising 
from entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms or disease-
causing organisms;   
(b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising 
from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-carrying organisms in foods, beverages of 
feedstuffs; 
(c) to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from 
diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread 
of pests;  or 
(d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the entry, 
establishment or spread of pests.  (Annex A, 1a) 
Under the Agreement, Members have the right to use these measures (Article 2:1) but 
only to the extent shown necessary by scientific evidence (Article 2:2).  Members are 
encouraged to base their measures on international standards (Article 3:1), although they 
                                                 
9 In practice, different countries use different standards with the HACCP approach and this has caused trade 
problems (OECD 1999, p. 20). 
10 Another way to overcome the credibility of quality signalling is for the exporting and importing firms to 
vertically integrate.  For a discussion, see Vetter and Karantininis (2002). 
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may set their own, higher standards, if there is scientific justification based on an 
assessment of risk (Article 3:3). 
 Article 5 of the Agreement is headed “Assessment of Risk and Determination of 
the Appropriate Level of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Protection”.  Risk assessment is 
defined as: 
[t]he evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease within the 
territory of an importing member according to the sanitary or phytosanitary measures which might 
be applied, and of the associated potential biological and economic consequences;  or the 
evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on human or animal health arising from additives, 
contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages and feedstuffs.  (Annex A, 
4). 
The appropriate level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection is defined as “[t]he level of 
protection deemed appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary 
measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within the territory.” (Annex A, 
5).  This definition is sometimes abbreviated to the ‘acceptable level of risk’. 
 In essence, if a Member chooses to impose more constraining standards, with 
respect to imports, than those established by the three international organisations, then the 
Member is obliged to undertake a formal risk assessment, paying particular attention, 
inter alia, to scientific evidence, relevant processes and production methods, and to 
relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods (Article 5:2).  In the case of risks 
associated with plants and animals, economic factors, including losses from production 
and costs of eradication, should be taken into account.  In the case of risks associated with 
humans, there is no provision to take economics into account.  Moreover, any measures 
should not be more trade restricting than necessary to achieve the appropriate level of 
protection (Articles 5:2−5:5).  It is recognised that relevant scientific evidence may not 
always be available and provisional measures may be adopted but there is also an 
obligation on Members to obtain the necessary data in order to complete an objective risk 
assessment (Article 5:7). 
4.  The Decision-Theoretic Framework 
 The food-safety system has three elements:  risk communication which involves 
consumers and their perceptions of risks;  risk management which involves products, 
firms and governments;  and risk assessment which involves science (Phillips and Wolfe 
2001, p. 3).  The discussion so far has touched on elements of each.  The amount of 
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information which consumers have about the safety of imported food depends upon risk 
communication;  the provision of that safety by exporting firms depends upon risk 
management in exporting countries;  and the regulatory import barriers imposed by 
importing country governments depends upon risk assessment undertaken either by them 
or through their acceptance of the internationally defined standards. 
 Measuring risk requires the estimation of probabilities.  Probabilities are usually 
interpreted as a measure only of the likelihood of an event, e.g., the presence in imported 
food of a health hazard.  However, in many situations in which risk assessment is 
undertaken to establish the safety of food, such a restricted interpretation may well be 
inadequate.  In such situations, probabilities may be vague or imprecise because the 
scientific evidence may be ambiguous or it may not even exist.  The users of these 
probabilities may be averse to uncertainty, i.e., they are averse to making decisions based 
upon ambiguous or imprecise probabilities.  If so, then a probability ought to be 
interpreted as having two dimensions, namely, the implication of the evidence and the 
weight of evidence, i.e., how much faith there is in the likelihood of the event.  When 
probabilities are used in a situation in which consumers are uncertainty averse, they really 
ought to be incorporated into a decision model which enables them to be used in this 
more comprehensive way.  One such approach is that provided by Choquet expected 
utility in which probabilities are not additive and they convey both the implication of 
evidence and the weight of evidence.11 
 However, implicit in the SPS Agreement is the notion that all that matters is the 
measurement of risk as a probability and that this measured probability need then only be 
compared with some other value of the probability which measures the a priori 
“acceptable level of risk”.12  By contrast, economists tend to use a framework for decision 
making under risk or uncertainty which incorporates expectation and utility, a framework 
which is obviously more general than that implicit in the Agreement.  Moreover, in such a 
framework, utility would be defined from the viewpoint of the food consumer, whereas in 
the Agreement, consumers play absolutely no part at all in terms of their preferences;  
                                                 
11 For a more detailed account of aversion to uncertainty in the context of the SPS Agreement, see 
MacLaren (2001).  Economic theory has provided several alternative decision-theoretic models which are 
relevant to uncertainty aversion, e.g., rank-dependent expected utility, prospect theory, regret theory, 
theories based on lexicographic orderings, and Choquet expected utility.  For a survey, see Camerer (1995). 
12 Interestingly, in the Appellate Body ruling in the Australian salmon case, it was stated that there is no 
requirement that a risk assessment need be expressed as a quantitative conclusion (Charnovitz 2002, p. 
214).  This ruling seems oddly inconsistent with a scientific approach to risk assessment. 
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they are only considered as people whose health may be at risk from imported food.13  
Another criticism often levelled at the Agreement is that it is not based on the 
precautionary principle.  However, this criticism is not valid because, as noted above 
(Section 3), under Article 5:7 of the Agreement governments can introduce provisional 
measures until more definitive scientific evidence can be made available upon which to 
base sounder import standards.14 
5.  Conclusions 
 Barriers to international trade in agricultural and food products exist for several 
reasons, one of which is to ensure food safety.  Food safety is a credence characteristic 
and this attribute causes market failure through imperfect and asymmetric information.  
One way in which government intervention in importing countries can improve upon the 
market outcome is to impose trade regulations as a way of providing the missing 
information.  Any such regulations need to be consistent with the SPS Agreement. 
 It is also in the interests of governments in exporting countries to overcome the 
market failure by putting in place regulations to ensure that their exports of food meet 
minimum levels of food safety.  The issue for them is whether their regulations should be 
enforced through public or private agencies.  Because of the credence characteristic of 
food safety, it is not possible for private firms credibly to commit to the provision of 
high-quality food exports in the absence of regulation. 
 In the application of the SPS Agreement to the area of consumer health and food 
safety, there is no scope for consumers’ preferences to be taken into account.  The 
consistency of import regulations is based on risk assessment involving only estimates of 
probabilities.  There is no place for consumers’ preferences about risk or for economic 
considerations.  This omission is perhaps the outcome of the original negotiations based 
upon pragmatism and the need to get agreement but it is an inherently unsatisfactory 
aspect of the Agreement.  A better approach would be to incorporate consumers’ 
preferences and non-additive probabilities into a more comprehensive decision-making 
framework.  The link between food-safety standards, trade barriers and the gains from 
trade would then be better defined. 
                                                 
13 For a wide-ranging discussion of the role that economics might play in the SPS Agreement, see Anderson 
et al. (2001). 
14 Another way of considering this principle in a modelling context is to think of it in terms of unforeseen 
contingencies (see Dekel et al., 1997). 
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